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1 Introduction
The analysis of the cyclicality of labour market dynamics has been a very active field
of research for the last two decades.1 Interest in this issue has been further increased
by the debate about the relative importance of the ins and outs of unemployment in
this context (cf. Darby, Haltiwanger, and Plant, 1986, and Shimer, 2007). While a
consensus seems to emerge that both inflows into and outflows from unemployment
have some role to play (cf. Elsby, Michaels, and Solon, 2009, and Fujita and Ramey,
forthcoming), important questions remain unanswered. One crucial question, raised by
Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009), is “why job-loss-induced inflows to unemployment
increase at the beginning of a recession and why outflows do not increase enough to
keep unemployment duration from rising.”
An obvious suspect in this context is the interaction of heterogeneous agents on
both sides of the labour market over the business cycle. However, as Moscarini and
Postel-Vinay (2008) point out, this process is up to now little understood. They argue
that, on the US labour market, specific phases of the business cycle see different types
of firms hiring different types of workers, which leads to specific labour market transi-
tions and wage dynamics. In particular, in the early phase of an economic expansion,
small firms hire mainly from the ranks of the unemployed, a process which results in
relatively low wages. In later phases of an economic expansion, hirings from larger firms
predominate. With the pool of unemployed workers having shrunk considerably, this
entails more direct job-to-job transitions from small to large firms, and higher wages.
The interaction of heterogeneous firms and workers thus has important implications
for both labour market transitions and the evolution of the wage structure.
Our analysis aims at testing whether this story holds when using both a very rich,
linked employer-employee data set, and a data set spanning three decades of work-
ers’ employment history. Both data sets are based on administrative micro data sets
providing information on dependent-status, social security employment for West Ger-
1The next section provides a brief overview of the literature.
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many. The former data set additionally contains information from a large firm survey.
Together, these two data sets make it possible to analyze the role of heterogeneity on
both sides of the West German labour market over the business cycle. We are thus
able to provide a complete set of stylized facts on this topic, and to conduct a rigorous
econometric analysis, controlling for both observed and unobserved heterogeneities on
both sides of the labour market.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section contains an overview of the
literature on the cyclicality of labour market dynamics. The third section describes the
data sets used in our analysis. The fourth section summarizes the stylized facts of West
German labour market dynamics, paying particular attention to the heterogeneities
involved. Section 5 offers an econometric analysis of the cyclicality of these dynamics.
The last section summarizes our main findings and concludes the discussion.
2 Labour Market Dynamics and Heterogeneity in
the Literature
Previous research on the dynamics of the labour market has shown that the reallocation
of jobs and workers is a pervasive phenomenon, which is also strongly influenced by the
business cycle. The empirical analysis of worker turnover and job turnover has a long
tradition, with the U.S. labour market having received particular attention.2 Recently,
the relative importance of hirings and separations for the cyclicality of labour market
dynamics has taken centre stage, as summarized by Yashiv (2008). Empirical evidence
for Germany remains relatively scarce. Schmidt (2000) uses a representative German
household survey, the German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP), in order to analyse the
dynamics of German labour market flows. His analysis stresses the heterogeneous
2Blanchard and Diamond (1989, 1990) were among the first to provide direct evidence on gross
worker flows in the U.S.. For analyses of worker flows and job flows in European countries see Burda
and Wyplosz (1994), and Contini and Rivelli (1997).
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experience of different demographic groups, especially with respect to their sensitivity
to cyclical factors. Fitzenberger and Garloff (2007) use the IAB employment subsample
(IABS) for the time period 1975 to 2001, and calculate labour market transitions.
However, they only consider year-on-year changes, which means that a lot of the actual
dynamics are not recorded in their study. Employing the same data set, Bachmann
(2005) shows that hirings play an important role for labour market dynamics.
One important weakness of the aforementioned studies is that they only control for
worker heterogeneity. This implies that they completely neglect the heterogeneity on
the firm side, as well as match-specific characteristics. As Hamermesh (2007) points
out, this can lead to severe misspecification problems if worker and firm characteristics
interact in a systematic way. Those problems can be avoided by the usage of linked
employer-employee data sets. Anderson and Meyer (1994) were among the first to use
this kind of data. In a comprehensive analysis for the U.S., they analyze the deter-
minants of worker flows by accounting for various individual and firm characteristics,
and quantify the relation between job and worker reallocation. Their findings suggest
that worker flows are distinct from job flows and that individual as well as firm ef-
fects are important factors for the determination of labour market dynamics. Other
studies that use linked employer-employee data to examine worker and job turnover
are Albæk and Sørensen (1998) for Denmark, Abowd, Corbel, and Kramarz (1999) for
France, Burgess, Lane, and Stevens (2000, 2001) for the U.S., and Alda, Allaart, and
Bellmann (2005) for Germany and the Netherlands.3 One common finding of these
studies is that almost all firms are simultaneously hiring and experiencing separations:
expanding firms continue to lose workers, while contracting firms continue to hire work-
ers, meaning that churning is an omnipresent feature of the labour market. Much of
this work points out that the amount of labour market dynamics varies substantially
between different workers and employers. Lane, Stevens, and Burgess (1996) for ex-
ample find that worker reallocation as well as job reallocation show a strong sectoral
3See Abowd and Kramarz (1999) for a comprehensive review.
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variation and tend to decrease with the age and the size of a firm. Another well doc-
umented empirical pattern is that worker flows are more pervasive among young and
low skilled employees, meaning that they are strongly affected by individual charac-
teristics. Studies that do not only take into account observed heterogeneity but do
also control for unobserved heterogeneity, which might affect transition probabilities,
remain relatively scarce. Bjelland, Fallick, Haltiwanger, and McEntarfer (2008) present
descriptive evidence on the importance of worker and firm characteristics for direct job-
to-job transitions using linked employer-employee data for the United States. They find
that the pace of these transitions is highly procylical, and varies systematically across
worker, job and employer characteristics. Frederiksen and Westergaard-Nielsen (2007)
analyse the effects of individual and workplace characteristics, as well as of the business
cycle, on individual job separations and the associated destination states in the Danish
private sector. They find that there is large heterogeneity both within and between
destination states. In examining the relationship between job flows and worker flows,
Burgess, Lane, and Stevens (2001) allow for firm fixed effects in order to control for
the unobserved heterogeneity that exists on the employer side.
When analyzing the evolution of hirings over the business cycle, it is important to
note that firms generally seem to have a preference for hiring workers who are currently
employed, rather than hiring out of unemployment. For example, Eriksson and Lager-
stro¨m (2006) show that, on the Swedish labour market, unemployed job applicants
face a lower probability to get contacted by a firm than otherwise identical employed
applicants. They argue that this is due to the fact that firms view employment status
as an important signal for productivity. Nagypa´l (2006) provides another theoretical
argument for why firms might prefer hiring employed, rather than unemployed, work-
ers. Workers arriving from unemployment are less likely to end up in a job they are
happy with than employed job searchers. Therefore, the former workers are more likely
to engage in job-shopping and to leave an employment relationship for a more appeal-
ing job. Given that hiring workers involves fixed costs, firms can economize on these
costs by hiring employed workers. It therefore seems important to analyze hirings from
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employment and hirings from unemployment separately.
There is thus a number of studies analysing labour market dynamics and the role
played by individual heterogeneity. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is
no literature on the determination of labour market mobility which takes into account
the observed as well as the unobserved heterogeneity that is present on both sides of
the labour market. In contrast to this, the research on wage determination is further
developed as it includes individual as well as firm fixed effects in the estimation equa-
tions. In one of the first studies of earnings based upon linked employer-employee data,
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) analyze the annual compensation for French
workers by holding the unobserved time-invariant characteristics of workers and firms
constant. Abowd, Kramarz, and Roux (2006) continue this line of research analzying
both worker and wage mobility. They take into account heterogeneity on both sides
of the labour market. However, they do not take into account workers’ transitions
from unemployment to employment. In this paper, we adopt one of the fixed effects
approaches proposed by Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) for wage regressions,
to the analysis of labour market transitions. In particular, we estimate a non-linear
model with establishment and individual fixed effects using German linked employer-
employee data. Therefore, we contribute to the existing literature by controlling for
the observed as well as unobserved heterogeneity on both sides of the labour market
when examining labor mobility out of employment and unemployment.
3 Data and Concepts
3.1 The data
The following analysis uses two complementary data sets provided by the Institute for
Employment Research (IAB), the IAB Employment Sample (IABS) and the LIAB,
a linked employer-employee data set. The basis of both data sets is the Employment
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Statistics Register, an administrative panel data set of the employment history of all in-
dividuals in Germany who worked in an employment covered by social security between
1975 and 2006.4 For 1995, this data source contains the employee history of nearly
79.4% of all employed persons in Western Germany, and 86.2% of all employed persons
in Eastern Germany. The basis of the employee history is the integrated notification
procedure for health insurance, the statutory pension scheme, and unemployment in-
surance. At the beginning and at the end of any employment spell, employers have
to notify the social security agencies. This information is exact to the day. For spells
spanning more than one calendar year, an annual report for each employee registered
within the social insurance system is compulsory, and provides an update on, for ex-
ample, the qualification and the current occupation of the employee. Further worker
characteristics included are the year of birth, sex, marital status, and nationality.5
The first data set we use, the IAB Employment Sample (IABS) is a 2% representa-
tive sample of the Employment Statistics Register for the time period 1975-2004, sup-
plemented with information on all unemployment spells of the workers covered. Given
this relatively long time span, we are able to observe two full business cycles. From this
sample, we exclude observations in East Germany, apprentices, trainees, homeworkers,
part-time workers, and individuals older than 65. This results in a sample with 1.05
million individual workers.
The second data set used in our analysis, the linked employer-employee data set of
the IAB (LIAB), combines the information on workers’ employment and unemployment
history described above with plant-level information from the IAB Establishment Panel,
an annual representative survey of German establishments that employ at least one
worker who pays social security contributions. Starting in 1993, this survey is drawn
4This data base has been used, among others, by Bender and von Wachter (2006) and Dustmann
and Meghir (2005).
5A detailed description of the Employment Statistics Register and the notification procedure is
given by Bender, Haas, and Klose (2000). Note that civil servants and self-employed workers are not
included in the data.
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from a stratified sample of the establishments included in the Employment Statistics
Register, where the stratification is done according to 10 establishment size classes
and 16 industries.6 The establishments covered by the survey were questioned each
year about various issues, such as the number of employees, the composition of the
workforce, sales and investments.7 Using the unique plant identification number, one
can match the information on workers with the establishment panel, and obtain a
linked employer-employee data set providing detailed information on individual and
establishment characteristics.8 In a first step of this matching process, establishments
who participated in the IAB Establishment Panel between 2000 and 2002 are selected.
In a second step, the Employment Statistics Register is used to link the sample of
establishments with the employee history information for all individuals who worked
at least one day in one of the selected establishments between 1997 and 2003. As
a consequence, meaningful establishment-based turnover and flow rates can only be
computed for these seven years. The resulting sample contains 1.9 million individuals
and 4,856 establishments.
Both the IABS and the LIAB are representative regarding employment covered by
the social security system but not regarding unemployment. Only those unemployed
who are entitled to transfer payments are covered. In both data sets, we can derive
three labour market states at each moment in time: employment (E) covered by social
security, unemployment (U), if the worker is receiving transfer payments, and non-
participation (N).9 Since the latter state cannot be directly observed, we define non-
participants as individuals out of sample. These individuals are not recorded in the data
6From 2000 onwards the stratification cells are defined over 20 industries.
7A detailed description of the IAB Establishment Panel is given by Ko¨lling (2000).
8Information on the LIAB data set is given by Alda, Bender, and Gartner (2005). As short
employment spells play an important role in our analysis, we use the longitudinal version of the
LIAB.
9In the IABS data, the record on unemployment benefit recipients are unreliably measured before
1980. As we can therefore not use the worker flows to and from unemployment for the time period
1975-1979, we start our analysis in 1980.
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sets, which implies that it is not possible to differentiate them from civil servants, self-
employed, retired and marginally employed workers. Regarding these labour market
states, there might exist measurement errors. Because of the way the data are collected,
both firms’ reports of a new employee and individuals’ notifications of moving into or
out of unemployment are not exactly consistent with the actual change of labour market
state. The latter potential measurement error can be corrected in the following way: If
the time lag between two employment or unemployment notifications does not exceed
30 days, it is defined as a direct transition between the two states recorded. We count
it as an intervening spell of non-participation if the time interval between the two
records is larger than 30 days. The descriptive statistics of the data set as used in the
econometric analysis are in Table A.1.
3.2 The concepts of worker flows and job flows
Since both data sets used contain daily information on the employment and unem-
ployment history of every individual in the sample, it is possible to calculate worker
flows taking into account every change of labour market state that occurs within a
given time period. We are thus able to compute the flows between employment, un-
employment and nonparticipation, as well as direct job-to-job transitions (EE flows)
using the establishment identification number. In addition to EE flows, our analysis
focuses on the flows from employment to unemployment and to nonparticipation (EU
and EN, respectively), and from unemployment and from nonparticipation to employ-
ment (UE and NE, respectively). We define as separation flows all flows emanating
from employment, St = EEt + EUt + ENt, and as accession flows all flows going to
employment, At = EEt + UEt +NEt. It should be noted here that our definition of a
job is establishment-based. Therefore a transition from one establishment to another
one within the same firm will also be identified as a job-to-job transition. Following
Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), we calculate the corresponding rates of each flow by
using the average of current and past employment (Et−1 − Et)/2 as the denominator.
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Since the LIAB data provide information on all workers employed in the establish-
ments covered by the data set for the time period 1997-2003, we are able to exploit the
individual information to calculate annual worker and job flows at the establishment
level. We define the stock of employment in establishment e at time t, Eet, as the
number of employment spells including the reference date June 30th in year t. Follow-
ing the standard terminology (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999), in which job flows are
defined as the net change in employment at an establishment e, the year-to-year job
flow rate is given by
JFRet =
Eet − Eet−1
(Eet + Eet−1)/2
=
∆Eet
(Eet + Eet−1)/2
, (1)
where Eet and Eet−1 reflect the level of employment in year t and year t−1, respectively.
The job reallocation rate for any given establishment is the absolute value of JFRet:
JRRet = | Eet − Eet−1
(Eet + Eet−1)/2
| (2)
A positive year-to-year job flow rate is called job creation rate, JCRet = JRRet if
JFRet ≥ 0, while a negative job flow rate is referred to as job destruction rate, JDRet =
JRRet if JFRet < 0. Following Burgess, Lane, and Stevens (2000) we define accession
and separation rates at the establishment level as follows:
ARet =
Aet
(Eet + Eet−1)/2
(3)
and
SRet =
Set
(Eet + Eet−1)/2
, (4)
where worker accessions Aet include any employment relationship which is observed
on June 30th in year t but not on June 30th in year t − 1. Correspondingly, worker
separations Set comprise any employment relationship which is observed in year t− 1
but not in year t. The worker turnover rate or the worker flow rate is measured as the
sum of accession and separation rates
WFRet =
Aet + Set
(Eet + Eet−1)/2
. (5)
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Note that by definition the change in employment must be equal to the difference
between accessions and separations, i.e. JRRet = |ARet−SRet|. Therefore, the worker
flow rate can also be expressed as
WFRet = JRRet + CFRet, (6)
where CFRet is the churning flow rate, or excess worker flow rate, i.e. the part of the
worker flows which does not contribute to a change of the workforce at the establish-
ment level.
4 Stylized Facts
4.1 Job, worker and churning flows: aggregate evidence
In this section, we derive some stylized facts concerning the cyclical features of worker
flows and job flows in the West German labour market. We start by analyzing the
evolution of worker flows over the cycle using the IABS data. Figure B.1 shows the
accession and separation rates for the time period 1980-2003. The shaded areas in
this figure indicate the times from the beginning of a recession (business cycle peak)
until the end of a recession (business cycle trough). The peaks of the German business
cycle are in 1980/I, 1992/I and 2001/I, while the troughs are in 82/IV, 93/IV and
2002/IV.10 Here one can see, as expected, that the accession rate is clearly procyclical.
The separation rate is procyclical as well, but less so than the accession rate, which
implies a reduction of the aggregate employment level during recessions. These findings
are in line with Bachmann (2005), who points out that during recessions a decline in
the hiring activity can be observed, together with a rise in separations.
In order to further investigate this matter, we split up the accession flows into EE
flows, UE flows and NE flows. The time series patterns of the three transitions for the
time period 1980-2003 are presented in Figure B.2. Regarding the cyclical behaviour,
10A recession is defined as a decline in GDP for two or more successive quarters of a year.
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one can see that job-to-job transitions show a clearly procyclical pattern, as do tran-
sitions from non-participation to employment. However, the flow from unemployment
to employment, being not as volatile as the other two worker flows, rises much earlier
and drops during periods of economic recovery. These observations indicate that the
outflow from unemployment dominates during recessions and during the beginning of
expansions, while job-to-job transitions are the most important source of accessions in
the mature phase of expansions. The three worker flows making up separations, namely
the EE flows, EU flows and EN flows, are displayed in Figure B.2. As one can see, the
job-to-job flows and the flows from employment to non-participation are procyclical,
while the flow from employment to unemployment starts to increase during recessions
and declines in periods of economic recovery. This means that we can observe a shift
from employment-to-unemployment transitions to job-to-job transitions in the mature
phase of the economic expansion.
Table A.2 displays the annual rates of job flows, worker flows and churning flows at
the establishment level over the time period 1997 to 2003, calculated from the LIAB.
Regarding the time series properties, one noteworthy fact is that the job creation rate
seems to be procyclical since it increases during the upturn period 1998-1999 and starts
to decrease at the beginning of the recession in 2000. In contrast to this, job destruction
is countercyclical, because it exhibits the opposite behaviour over the time period under
consideration. As job destruction does not vary to a significantly greater degree than
job creation, the job reallocation rate shows an acyclical behaviour.11 Furthermore,
we find evidence for a strongly procyclical behaviour of worker and churning flows.12
Looking at job creation and job destruction, the table shows that both take place
simultaneously in all observed years. We find job destruction rates ranging from 4.1%
to 10.6%, while employment expanded over the sample period. Finally, we see the
11This result is in line with what has been found for OECD countries (OECD, 1996). However,
Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) report job reallocation to be countercyclical in the U.S.
12The same finding has been made by Burgess, Lane, and Stevens (2000) and Albæk and Sørensen
(1998) for Maryland (U.S.) and Denmark, respectively.
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mean job reallocation rate at a value of 17.2%, and the worker reallocation rate at a
level almost three times higher. Hence, churning flows make up at least two thirds of
total worker flows and therefore are a pervasive phenomenon of the German labour
market. This implies that firms hire and fire workers, and that workers leave and enter
jobs, mostly for reasons related to specific firm needs and worker abilities. Thus, the
heterogeneity on both sides of the labour market seems to play an important role for
labour market dynamics. To this issue we now turn.
4.2 Two-sided heterogeneity and labour market dynamics
4.2.1 Cross-sectional features
In order to analyse the interaction between worker and firm heterogeneities on both
sides of the labour market in more detail, we first present stylized facts about worker
flows for different establishment categories in Table A.4 and for different worker cat-
egories in Table A.5. Several features are worth noting. Regarding the establishment
categories, it becomes apparent that the size, the age and the industry of establish-
ments have a strong impact on worker flows. There is a general tendency of hiring
flows and separation flows to decline with the establishment size as well as the estab-
lishment age, implying that in smaller and younger establishments more fluctuations
exist. This finding is consistent with other research (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999, and
Lane, Stevens, and Burgess, 1996). With respect to the industry, one can see from the
tables that worker flows are relatively low in the production sector, while they are very
high in the construction sector. In this respect, the transitions between unemployment
and employment display the strongest difference. While in the government sector, the
EU- and UE-rates are close to 5%, they reach more than 20% in the construction sector,
which can mainly be attributed to seasonal variations. Looking at worker categories,
one can see that there are substantial age-specific differences in worker flows. The flows
decrease with the age of employees, which can be explained by the fact that older work-
ers tend to have accumulated more job-specific human capital, and that they are more
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likely than younger workers to have ended up in a job which suits their skills. Finally,
workers characterized by a lower skill level particularly transit between employment
and unemployment as well as employment and non-participation. More highly skilled
employees, however, are more likely to experience job-to-job transitions. To sum up,
we can see that labour market dynamics vary with worker as well as establishment
categories, with the size of an establishment having a particularly strong impact. For
that reason, we now examine the behaviour of labour market dynamics across various
establishment size categories in more detail.
As pointed out in the introduction, firms are likely to have preferences over the pre-
vious labour market state of their new hires. Firms are likely to prefer hiring employed
workers because unemployment may be perceived as a negative signal. Furthermore,
the expected duration of a new job is higher for previously employed job seekers be-
cause the match is likely to be a better fit than if the worker had been previously
unemployed. In order to investigate the consequences of these mechanisms, we anal-
yse the origin of new hires for different establishment size classes. Looking at all the
establishments considered, 40.8% of the new hired men come from employment, 29.4%
come from unemployment, and 29.8% from nonparticipation (cf. Table A.6). For fe-
male workers we can observe that a smaller proportion is hired out of employment
(33.9%) and unemployment (19.6%), but a much higher proportion stems from non-
participation (46.5%). The hiring source, however, depends strongly on the size of the
establishment. Small establishments hire about an equal proportion of their new male
workers from employment and from unemployment (34.4% and 34.8%, respectively).
With growing establishment size, however, the proportion of hires from employment
increases at the expense of hirings from unemployment. Very large establishments hire
51.2% of their new workers from employment, but only 15.1% from unemployment.
Likewise, for women a similar pattern can be observed, although not as strongly as for
men. Thus, to the extent that firms prefer hiring employed workers, large firms are
able to compete more successfully for employed job seekers in the labour market.
An examination of the distribution of destination states that follow a job separation
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leads to very similar results (cf. Table A.7). Considering all observations for male
workers, 33.3% of the separations lead to a new employment relationship, 24.7% are
followed by unemployment, and 42.0% by nonparticipation. When we split up the
establishments into different size classes, we can observe strong size-specific variations
in the distribution of separation destinations. In particular, for small establishments
we find a roughly equal proportion of the separations to lead to a new employment
(30.5%) and to unemployment (31.4%). In contrast to this, separations from very
large establishments are followed by employment in 32.3% of cases, and only 14.4%
are followed by an unemployment spell. For women we see that, taking into account
the smallest establishments in the sample, 28.2% of the separations lead to a new
employment, 22.2% to unemployment and with 49.6% the largest proportion end in
nonparticipation. The share of separations to employment and to unemployment are
both decreasing with establishment size. But since the latter one falls at a higher rate,
we again can observe that the separations from large establishments are more often
followed by employment (24.7%) than by unemployment (14.8%).
4.2.2 Cyclical properties
As we are mainly interested in the cyclical features of labour market dynamics, we
now analyse the evolution of the different flows over time in more detail. Figure B.3
shows the hiring flows EE, UE, and NE, computed as the share of hirings, for different
establishment size classes. As in Table A.6, it again becomes obvious that for larger
establishments, job-to-job transitions play the biggest role, whereas the outflow from
unemployment makes up only a small part of hirings. For large establishments, this
stylised fact does not change over the business cycle. For smaller establishments the
picture is more diverse as the importance of the different hiring sources changes over
the business cycle. While during recessions and the beginning of expansions, a larger
part of the newly hired employees comes from unemployment than from employment,
the opposite is the case during the mature phase of economic expansions. One can
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see very similar patterns in Figure B.4, which presents for different establishment size
classes the three separation flows as a share of total separations. Here the employer-to-
employer flows also seem to gain importance with increasing establishment size, while
the flows from employment to unemployment become less important the larger the
establishments get. Looking at smaller establishments, however, we observe strong
cyclical fluctuations in the importance of the destination states. During recessions, the
flow to unemployment becomes more important and is the most relevant separation
flow in the early phase of an economic upturn, whereas the importance of job-to-job
transitions is largest during later expansion phases and decreases afterwards.
In order to emphasize the differences in the behaviour of the different labour market
flows between establishment size classes, we calculate the size-specific worker flows as
a share of total worker flows. That is, we calculate the following fraction:
SFgt =
Fgt
Ft
, (7)
where Fgt refers to a particular flow occurring in establishment size class g in year t,
and Ft denotes the same, but economy-wide, flow in year t. We calculate the above
share for hirings and for separations, and use a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to isolate
the cyclical from the structural component.13 The times series for the HP-filtered devi-
ations from the trend are displayed in Figure B.5. As one can see, there exist important
establishment-size specific differences in the cyclical timing of hirings. In particular,
smaller establishments already increase their share in hirings during periods of reces-
sions. In contrast to this, the hiring activity of large firms, relative to smaller firms,
decreases during recessions and mainly takes place in the mature phase of economic
expansions. These observations indicate that the smaller the establishments are, the
earlier the hirings occur. It might be the case that larger establishments start hiring at
a later date because they lay off fewer people during recessions, which implies that their
capacity utilization fluctuates to a greater extent than that of smaller establishments.
13Following Ravn and Uhlig (2002) we use a HP smoothing parameter value of 6.25 for our yearly
data.
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Regarding the timing of separations, we can observe that for smaller establishments,
the share in match separations rises during periods of recessions, while it decreases in
larger establishments.
To assess the differences in the hiring and separation behaviour between establish-
ments with different job turnover rates, we calculate the fraction in equation (7), where
Fgt now refers to a particular flow occurring in the turnover size category g in year t.
Figure B.6 displays the detrended time series. Although the time period under con-
sideration is relatively short to investigate empirical regularities, it becomes apparent
that establishments of different turnover categories also show variation in the timing
of hirings and separations. While establishments with a low job turnover reduce their
hiring activity during the recession and raise it in mature phase of the expansion, es-
tablishments characterized by a high turnover hire most notably during the recession
and the early phase of the expansion. This implies that establishments with a high
turnover show the same cyclical timing as small establishments and supports the find-
ing that small firms are characterized by a high turnover. The reverse holds for large
establishments (cf. Table A.3). While we can observe similar patterns for the cyclical
timing of separations, the latter time series is much more noisy, which makes it difficult
to draw clear-cut conclusions in this case.
Finally, we investigate whether the evolution of the churning rate differs over time
between establishments of different size. Figure B.7 shows that this is clearly the case.
In particular, the peak of the churning rate occurs earlier the smaller the establishment.
Given that the peak of the business cycle occurred in 2001/IV, establishments belonging
to the smallest size class had their highest churning rate three years before. Contrary to
that, the peak of the churning rate of large establishments can be observed in 2001, i.e.
towards the end of the boom. This is consistent with the fact that larger establishments
hire more workers during economic upswings, and that these hirings come from existing
employment relationships, resulting in direct job-to-job transitions. Whether this fact
is related to the evolution of wages, is discussed in the next section.
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4.3 Job-to-job transitions and wages
In order to analyse whether large firms compete for employed workers by offering them
higher wages, we first calculate the “fraction of EE flows leading to a higher wage”,
which is defined as EE flows leading to a higher wage divided by total EE flows, for
each year in the time period 1975-2004.14 Since this time series contains a strong trend,
again a Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP filter) is used. The HP-filtered deviations from the
trend are displayed in Figure B.8. As expected, the share of job-to-job transitions
yielding a higher wage decreases during times of recession and rises until the mature
phase of the economic expansion. This observed procyclical pattern can be put down
to the fact that in periods of economic recovery employers want to attract employed job
seekers, resulting in an increase in the availability of better paid jobs (see Pissarides,
1994). During economic downturns, however, better jobs and higher wages are hard
to find. Figure B.9 illustrates that the magnitude and the cyclical behavior of this
fraction is very similar for job-to-job transitions to larger establishments and job-to-job
transitions to smaller establishments. Furthermore, the series are relatively noisy and
seem to be partly driven by idiosyncratic factors unrelated to the business cycle. This
could be due to the effects of the institutional settings of the German labour market
institutions, such as trade unions, making wages relatively unresponsive to economic
conditions, which results in wages reacting only weakly to differences between firms
(such as firm size) or to changes in aggregate economic factors, the business cycle.
This, however, is a matter of further investigation.
14Due to the upper contribution limit to the social security system in Germany, the wages reported
in the data set are top coded. In order to address this top-coding problem we leave unconsidered the
wages close to the contribution ceiling.
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5 Econometric Analysis
5.1 Econometric specification
The descriptive analysis indicated that two-sided heterogeneity plays an important
role for the cyclicality of labour market dynamics. We now want to analyse this issue
econometrically, taking into account observable individual characteristics, observable
establishment characteristics, and unobserved heterogeneity on both sides of the labour
market.
We start by investigating the determinants of worker flows. The aim is to find out
how the heterogeneity on both sides of the labour market affects the probability of
person i in establishment e of experiencing a certain transition at time t, yiet. For that
purpose, we use two different versions of a fixed effects logit model:
P (yiet = 1) =
exp(xitα1 + fetβ1 + gdptγ1 + δi)
1 + exp(xitα1 + fetβ1 + gdptγ1 + δi)
(8)
P (yiet = 1) =
exp(xitα2 + fetβ2 + gdptγ2 + δi + λe)
1 + exp(xitα2 + fetβ2 + gdptγ2 + δi + λe)
, (9)
where i = {1, ..., N} denotes the number of persons in the data set, e = {1, ..., E} the
number of establishments, and t = {1, ..., T} the number of quarters. As dependent
variables, we consider separations (yiet = siet), accessions (yiet = aiet), transitions from
unemployment to employment (yiet = ueiet), and direct job-to-job-transitions (yiet =
eeiet). In particular, the logit model for separations specifies the probability whether or
not an individual leaves the establishment between t− 1 and t, while the logit models
for the accession flows specify what happened to individuals between t− 1 and t for all
employees being employed at time t. These probabilities are explained by observable
person characteristics xit (age, skill level, duration of previous employment, duration of
previous unemployment) as well as observable firm characteristics fet (industry, dummy
variable indicating large establishment size).15 The vector gdpt, our measure of the
15Large establishments are defined as those employing more than 100 workers. Trying alternative
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business cycle, contains lagged GDP growth (lags 1 to 4) and captures the dynamic
structure of the labour market process under investigation.16 Since the descriptive
analysis has shown that there exist relevant size-specific variations in the cyclical timing
of hirings and separations, we interact gdpt with a dummy variable indicating large
establishments.17
In the first version of the fixed effects logit model (8), we also include a person
fixed effect δi. This fixed effect can be removed by time-demeaning the data, which
implies that we are able to control for the part of the individual unobserved hetero-
geneity which does not vary over time. But since this fixed effects-procedure eliminates
all time-invariant effects, it is not possible to explicitly use time-invariant covariates
as explanatory variables. Therefore, the fixed effect δi indicates the impact of both
observable and unobservable time-invariant characteristics.
The second version (equation 9) extends the first one by additionally including an
establishment fixed effect, allowing us to take into account unobserved heterogeneity
both on the firm side and on the worker side of the labour market. Abowd, Kra-
marz, and Margolis (1999) introduce various estimation methods to deal with firm and
worker fixed effects in linear models. Amongst these is a method, referred to as spell
fixed effects-approach by Andrews, Schank, and Upward (2004), which gives the op-
portunity to sweep out all time-invariant unobservable effects by time-demeaning each
unique worker-establishment combination (or each spell). We now adopt this estima-
tion method for our non-linear logit model and define the spell-level heterogeneity or
spell fixed effect as
pis = δi + λe, (10)
definitions, we find very similar estimation results.
16We have also estimated the model using only one GDP growth lag as explanatory variable and
the estimation results are robust to alternative model specifications.
17As Ai and Norton (2003) point out, special care has to be taken when interpreting the coefficients
of interaction terms in nonlinear models. We use their method of calculating the marginal effect of
the interaction term as the cross derivative of the expected value of the dependent variable.
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such that the two fixed effects logit model (equation 9) is now given by
P (yiet = 1) =
exp(xitα2 + fetβ2 + gdptγ2 + pis)
1 + exp(xitα2 + fetβ2 + gdptγ2 + pis)
. (11)
Since neither δi nor λe vary for each spell of an employee within an establishment, the
spell fixed effects can be eliminated by subtracting averages at the spell-level, which
implies that we are able to control for all time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.18
As in the first version of the fixed effects logit model (equation (8)), the effect of time-
invariant regressors is absorbed by the fixed effect. In both versions we correct the
standard errors for clustering at the individual level and spell level, respectively.
5.2 Estimation results
We present the results from estimating the fixed effects logit model in the following way.
Table A.10 shows the marginal effects and robust standard errors for separation flows,
while Tables A.8 and A.9 display the estimation results when we split up accession flows
into the UE and EE flow. These tables include only the main variables of interest. Note
that in the spell fixed effects logit model, only those worker-establishment combinations
are considered that show a variation in the dependent variable. This leads to a loss in
observations, which implies that the sample used by the spell fixed effects logit model
is smaller than the sample used by the logit model with only individual fixed effects.
To allow for a better comparison between the two estimation methods - the individual
fixed effects estimation and the spell fixed effects estimation - the tables additionally
provide the results of a restricted individual fixed effects estimation. This estimation
is based on the same sample that was used for the spell fixed effects estimation.
5.2.1 Hirings
In our analysis of hirings, we concentrate on direct job-to-job transitions and transitions
from unemployment to employment. An econometric analysis of the flow from nonpar-
18Note that this type of heterogeneity is unobserved by the econometrician, but that it might well,
and in fact is likely to, be observed by firms and workers.
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ticipation to employment does not seem useful, because controlling for the duration
spent in nonparticipation is impossible (the workers residing in nonparticipation are
not observed in our data sets), and because nonparticipation is a very heterogeneous
labour market state in our data set. We thus analyse the two hiring flows, EE and
UE, separately. In particular, our regressions examine the probability that a worker
employed at a particular firm was hired (from another employment, or from unemploy-
ment) during the current quarter. The results are displayed in Tables A.8 and A.9,
respectively.
For both, the probability of a hire from employment, and from unemployment,
the establishment size exerts a negative effect. Furthermore, the age of an employee
reduces the two probabilities as well, as do medium skills, and high skills for hirings
from unemployment. The estimated coefficients of the GDP variables in Table A.8
indicate that a one standard deviation increase of GDP leads to a 1.7 percentage point
increase in the probability of EE flows.19 This implies that the probability of small
firms hiring workers out of another employment relationship is higher during a cyclical
upswing, which reflects the procyclicality of job-to-job transitions at the aggregate
level. This effect is long-lasting, and increasing up to lag 3. Looking at the coefficients
of the interaction term of (lagged) GDP with firm size, one can see that for large
establishments this effect is initially slightly lower. A one standard deviation increase
of GDP raises the likelihood of an EE hire by about 1.5 percentage points. But for lags
2 and 3 the cyclical effect is higher than for small establishments. This implies that
higher GPD growth increases the propensity to hire workers out of another employment
more strongly for large firms than it does for small firms, although with a certain lag.
The propensity to hire unemployed workers displays the opposite cyclical features
(cf. Table A.9): The coefficients of the GDP variables indicate that in small establish-
ments the probability of UE hires decreases by 0.28 percentage points if GDP rises by
19The standard deviation for EE flows divided by the standard deviation for GDP is 5.89. Multi-
plying the GDP coefficient (0.0028) gives the effect of a one standard deviation change in GDP on
the probability of transiting from one job to another one.
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one standard deviation. That is, the overall probability that an employed worker has
been hired from unemployment is higher in a recession, which reflects the countercycli-
cal nature of the transitions from unemployment to employment. Furthermore, the
effect is relatively long-lasting. This pattern, however, does not hold for large estab-
lishments, as shown by the coefficients on (lagged) GDP interacted with establishment
size. Here a one standard deviation increase of GDP leads to an increase of the prob-
ability of hiring from unemployment of 3.6 percentage points. This means that, for
large establishments, the overall propensity to hire out of unemployment is procyclical
in the short run (contemporaneous GDP and GDP lagged by one quarter). For GDP
lags 2 and 3, this propensity becomes countercyclical. These results are in line with
our observations in the descriptive analysis: at the beginning of a boom, hirings from
unemployment by large firms are initially unaffected, but rise later.
Another feature emerging from the regression results is that the differences between
the results obtained from worker fixed effects and spell fixed effects are much larger for
direct job-to-job transitions than for transitions from unemployment to employment. In
particular, in the case of the hazard of experiencing a direct employer-to-employer tran-
sition, taking into account spell fixed effects reduces the coefficients on the explanatory
variables significantly. This is not the case for the hazard of transiting from unemploy-
ment to employment, where the coefficients of the spell fixed effects estimation are very
similar to that of the worker fixed effects estimation.20 This implies that unobserved
characteristics play a much more important role for job-to-job transitions. There are
several explanations for this. First, employed job searchers are better informed with
respect to both their own abilities and potential jobs than their unemployed counter-
parts. Therefore, they are less dependent upon easily observable characteristics, and
unobserved match and firm characteristics become more important. Second, employed
job searchers, being employed and earning a wage, are likely to be more choosey with
respect to future jobs than unemployed job searchers. Therefore, they will turn down
20Note that for both transitions, the spell fixed effects are defined with respect to the destination
state.
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job offers which are unlikely to lead to a good match, and where unobserved firm char-
acteristics seem unfavourable. Unemployed job searchers, on the other hand, have a
much lower reservation threshold. They will therefore accept jobs with unfavourable
unobserved characteristics more often. Third, the labour market history of employed
workers may provide more useful signals to firms than that of unemployed workers.
Firms may therefore be able to find workers which suit their needs more easily among
the employed than among the unemployed, i.e. sorting of workers by firms is more
efficient in the case of employed workers.
5.2.2 Match separations
The estimated marginal effects of job separation, displayed in Table A.10, largely
confirm the results from the descriptive analysis of the last section. In particular,
the coefficients obtained from the individual fixed effects estimation indicate that the
probability of separation significantly declines with the size of an establishment, as
well as with the employees’ skill level. Furthermore, individuals experience fewer job
separations with increasing age and increasing employment duration. For individuals
aged 55-65, however, we observe a rise in the separation probability, which can mainly
be explained by retirements.
Regarding the cyclical behaviour, i.e. the impact of GDP on the probability of
separation, the estimation results indicate that separations are procyclical. This effect
is significant for lags up to t − 2.21 As the coefficients on the interaction variables
of (lagged) GDP with the firm size dummy variable make clear, the impact of GDP,
both contemporaneously and lagged by one quarter, is smaller for large firms. This
implies that employees in large firms are affected more slowly by changes in GDP than
employees in small firms. However, the interaction with GDP lags 2 to 4 indicates that
eventually, employees at large firms are strongly affected by GDP growth as well.
The results from the spell fixed effects estimation are qualitatively similar. However,
21This is mainly due to the fact that separations also include direct job-to-job transitions, which are
strongly procyclical. See Bachmann (2005) for an explicit analysis of the different separation flows.
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the coefficients on the explanatory variables in the estimation with spell fixed effects
are an order of magnitude smaller than in the estimation with worker fixed effects.
This means that unobserved match characteristics play an important role for these
transitions. If these unobserved characteristics are not explicitly taken into account,
they are absorbed by observable worker and establishment characteristics. This is due
to the fact that these observable characteristics are correlated with the unobserved
characteristics. In other words, regressions without spell fixed effects feature inflated,
and potentially biased, coefficients on the observable explanatory variables.
6 Conclusion
Using two data sets on individual workers’ labour market histories derived from Ger-
man administrative data which allow us to identify heterogeneities on both sides of
the labour market, we investigate the cyclicality of worker and job flows. Taking into
account both observed and unobserved characteristics, our analysis stresses the im-
portance of the interaction between heterogeneous workers and establishments in this
context. We find that small establishments hire more workers from unemployment than
their larger counterparts. Conversely, large establishments hire much more workers out
of an existing employment relationship. We argue that this is in all likelihood due to
the fact that large firms compete more successfully for employed job seekers than small
firms.
As for the importance of heterogeneous firms and workers for the cyclicality of
labour market dynamics, we find that small firms hire mainly at the beginning of an
economic expansion. Later on in the expansion, hirings more frequently result from
direct job-to-job transitions, with employed workers moving to larger firms. Contrary to
our expectations, workers moving to larger firms do not experience significantly larger
wage gains than workers moving to smaller establishments. This could be explained by
the fact that institutions such as trade unions may make wages relatively unresponsive
to economic conditions, which results in wages reacting only weakly to differences
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between firms.
In our econometric analysis, we are mainly interested in the impact of firm size
on the probability of workers having been hired from unemployment or out of an
existing employment, and on the probability of match separation. Our results are
in line with the descriptive evidence. First, the probability of a worker being hired
out of another job is procyclical, and it is more strongly affected by GDP growth for
larger firms than for smaller firms. Second, for larger firms, this effect comes later
on in the expansion. Third, hirings from unemployment are nearly acyclical for large
firms, and countercyclical for small firms. This reflects the fact that small firms rely on
unfavourable business cycle conditions to recruit unemployed workers that suit their
needs; such workers are more numerous in the pool of the unemployed during recessions.
Fourth, our use of spell fixed effects to take into account the unobserved heterogeneities
on the two sides of the labour market significantly reduces the coefficients on the
explanatory variables. This shows that unobserved characteristics play an important
role for these transitions, and that regressions without two-sided fixed effects feature
artificially inflated, and potentially biased, coefficients on the observable explanatory
variables. Finally, our regression results show that unobserved characteristics play
a more important role for employed job seekers than for the unemployed. This is
arguably a consequence of the informational advantage of employed workers relative
to the unemployed, as well as of more efficient sorting of employed workers by firms.
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Appendix A Tables
Table A.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Definition
EE 0.0228 0.1493 Direct job-to-job transition
EU 0.0172 0.1076 Transition from employment to unemployment
EN 0.0647 0.2461 Transition from employment to nonparticipation
NE 0.0626 0.2171 Transition from nonparticipation to employment
UE 0.0169 0.1291 Transition from unemployment to employment
Separation 0.0666 0.2493 EE + EU + EN
Hiring 0.0661 0.2484 EE + UE + NE
Age 38.5059 11.3684 Age of individual
Low-skilled 0.1938 0.3874 Individual holds a lower secondary school diploma but
no professional degree
Medium-skilled 0.6959 0.4680 Individual holds a lower secondary school diploma and
professional degree; or a high school diploma and but
no professional degree; or a school diploma and a pro-
fessional degree
High-skilled 0.1079 0.2516 Individual holds a degree from a university or a uni-
versity of applied sciences
GDP 0.4811 0.8792 GDP growth rate (in %)
Large 0.4953 0.4999 Establishment with more than 100 employees
Employment duration 24.2992 23.0295 Duration of previous employment spell (in quarters)
Unemployment duration 3.1852 3.8576 Duration of previous unemployment spell (in quarters)
Agriculture, Mining, Energy 0.0391 0.1682 Dummy for employment in specific industry
Production 0.3671 0.4820 “
Construction 0.0778 0.2677 “
Trade, Transport 0.2120 0.4087 “
Services 0.2330 0.4162 “
State 0.0671 0.2322 “
Source: IABS; GDP are official figures from the German Statistical Office.
Notes: Statistics refer to the quarterly data set created by the authors and used in the econometric analysis.
Flows normalized by labour force (E+U). Time period considered: 1980/I-2003/III.
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Table A.2: The dynamics of worker and job flows at the establishment level
JCR JDR JRR AR SR WFR CFR
All observations 0.088 0.084 0.172 0.207 0.204 0.411 0.239
1997 0.103 0.106 0.209 0.201 0.204 0.404 0.195
1998 0.130 0.089 0.218 0.256 0.215 0.470 0.252
1999 0.158 0.049 0.207 0.275 0.166 0.441 0.234
2000 0.127 0.041 0.130 0.270 0.228 0.498 0.286
2001 0.088 0.091 0.180 0.218 0.221 0.439 0.259
2002 0.076 0.095 0.171 0.172 0.190 0.362 0.191
2003 0.079 0.104 0.183 0.135 0.160 0.295 0.112
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on LIAB 1993-2006.
Note: JCR: Job creation rate; JDR: Job destruction rate; JRR: Job reallocation
rate; AR: Accession rate; SR: Separation rate; WFR: Worker flow rate; CFR:
Churning flow rate. The aggregate figures are calculated as described in Section
3.2, they are weighted using adjusted sample weights.
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Table A.3: Worker and job flow rates at the establishment level across different estab-
lishment categories
JCR JDR JRR AR SR WFR CFR
All observations 0.088 0.084 0.172 0.208 0.204 0.411 0.239
by establishment age
Founded before 1990 0.085 0.079 0.164 0.201 0.195 0.396 0.232
Founded after 1990 0.091 0.087 0.178 0.211 0.207 0.418 0.240
by establishment size
1-19 employees 0.101 0.097 0.198 0.294 0.290 0.584 0.386
20-99 employees 0.078 0.069 0.157 0.217 0.208 0.425 0.268
100-999 employees 0.044 0.042 0.086 0.170 0.168 0.338 0.252
1000 and more employees 0.035 0.031 0.066 0.115 0.111 0.226 0.160
by industry
Agriculture, Energy, Mining 0.043 0.026 0.069 0.202 0.185 0.387 0.318
Production 0.033 0.041 0.074 0.123 0.131 0.254 0.180
Construction 0.095 0.035 0.130 0.291 0.231 0.522 0.392
Trade, Transport 0.067 0.068 0.135 0.253 0.254 0.507 0.372
Services 0.083 0.073 0.156 0.257 0.247 0.504 0.348
State 0.026 0.023 0.049 0.081 0.078 0.159 0.110
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on LIAB 1993-2006.
Note: See notes to Table A.2. All figures are weighted averages of the seven annual values (1997-
2003).
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Table A.4: Worker flow rates across different establishment categories
EE NE UE EN EU
All observations 0.075 0.138 0.070 0.142 0.069
by establishment age
Founded before 1990 0.061 0.098 0.065 0.083 0.045
Founded after 1990 0.084 0.143 0.081 0.156 0.079
by establishment size
1-19 employees 0.143 0.204 0.188 0.182 0.143
20-99 employees 0.098 0.132 0.087 0.140 0.073
100-999 employees 0.072 0.109 0.045 0.119 0.042
1000 and more employees 0.044 0.095 0.018 0.108 0.020
by industry
Agriculture, Energy, Mining 0.058 0.122 0.106 0.138 0.094
Production 0.054 0.101 0.043 0.110 0.046
Construction 0.095 0.153 0.207 0.160 0.211
Trade, Transport 0.108 0.165 0.087 0.169 0.085
Services 0.091 0.186 0.078 0.174 0.071
State 0.048 0.105 0.053 0.134 0.051
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on LIAB 1993-2006.
Note: EE: Employer-to-employer flows; NE: Nonparticipation-to-employment
flows; UE: unemployment-to-employment flows; EN: Employment-to-
nonparticipation flows; EU: Employment-to-unemployment flows. All figures
are calculated as described in Section 3.2, they are weighted averages of the
seven annual values (1997-2003).
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Table A.5: Worker flow rates across different worker categories
EE NE UE EN EU
All observations 0.075 0.138 0.070 0.142 0.069
by individuals’ age
Age 15-24 0.172 0.334 0.200 0.383 0.165
Age 25-29 0.126 0.201 0.104 0.182 0.093
Age 30-34 0.102 0.138 0.071 0.141 0.067
Age 35-39 0.076 0.098 0.064 0.098 0.062
Age 40-44 0.060 0.080 0.060 0.079 0.059
Age 45-49 0.044 0.074 0.053 0.075 0.053
Age 50-54 0.036 0.070 0.045 0.088 0.047
Age 55-65 0.022 0.085 0.029 0.080 0.063
by individuals’ sex
Male 0.076 0.111 0.066 0.116 0.070
Female 0.075 0.201 0.072 0.202 0.069
by individuals’ education
Low-skilled 0.066 0.183 0.111 0.195 0.119
Medium-Skilled 0.071 0.120 0.058 0.129 0.056
High-Skilled 0.092 0.122 0.023 0.093 0.026
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on LIAB 1993-2006.
Note: See notes to Table A.4.
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Table A.6: Distribution of hiring sources by establishment size
Hirings from
Employment Unemployment Nonparticipation
Establishment size Women Men Women Men Women Men
All observations 0.339 0.408 0.196 0.294 0.465 0.298
1-19 0.337 0.344 0.205 0.348 0.458 0.308
20-99 0.334 0.404 0.210 0.316 0.456 0.280
100-999 0.343 0.483 0.178 0.227 0.479 0.290
1000 and more 0.356 0.512 0.145 0.151 0.499 0.337
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: All figures are calculated as described in Section 3.2, they are weighted averages of
the annual values (1980-2003).
Table A.7: Distribution of destination states after separation by establishment size
Separations to
Employment Unemployment Nonparticipation
Establishment size Women Men Women Men Women Men
All observations 0.272 0.333 0.199 0.247 0.529 0.420
1-19 0.282 0.305 0.222 0.314 0.496 0.381
20-99 0.275 0.344 0.203 0.256 0.522 0.400
100-999 0.259 0.367 0.175 0.181 0.566 0.452
1000 and more 0.247 0.323 0.148 0.144 0.605 0.533
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: See notes to Table A.6 .
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Table A.8: Fixed effects estimation, employer-to-employer flows
FE (individual) FE (spell) FErestr (individual)
Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.)
large -.0760 *** (.002) -.0001 *** (.000) -.0154 *** (.001)
Age 25-29 -.0446 *** (.002) -.0001 *** (.000) -.0270 *** (.001)
Age 30-34 -.0832 *** (.002) -.0002 *** (.000) -.0402 *** (.001)
Age 35-39 -.1058 *** (.002) -.0003 *** (.000) -.0473 *** (.001)
Age 40-44 -.1173 *** (.002) -.0004 *** (.000) -.0494 *** (.001)
Age 45-49 -.1244 *** (.002) -.0004 *** (.000) -.0497 *** (.001)
Age 50-54 -.1342 *** (.003) -.0003 *** (.000) -.0493 *** (.001)
Age 55-65 -.1537 *** (.003) -.0003 *** (.000) -.0508 *** (.001)
Medium-skilled -.0214 *** (.002) -.0001 * (.000) -.0052 *** (.001)
High-skilled .0048 (.005) .0000 (.000) -.0011 (.001)
duration empl 2-5 .0586 *** (.002) .0000 *** (.000) .0048 *** (.000)
duration empl 6-10 .0283 *** (.002) .0001 *** (.000) .0079 *** (.000)
duration empl 11-20 .0252 *** (.002) .0002 *** (.000) .0197 *** (.001)
duration empl 21-30 .0302 *** (.003) .0007 *** (.000) .0507 *** (.002)
duration 30 over .1230 *** ( .003 ) .0022 *** ( .000 ) .1317 *** (.003)
GDP(t) .0028 *** (.001) .0000 *** (.000) .0004 *** (.000)
GDP(t-1) .0034 *** (.001) .0000 *** (.000) .0004 *** (.000)
GDP(t-2) .0096 *** (.001) .0001 *** (.000) .0011 *** (.000)
GDP(t-3) .0122 *** (.001) .0001 *** (.000) .0014 *** (.000)
GDP(t-4) .0094 *** (.001) .0000 *** (.000) .0009 *** (.000)
GDP*large -.0002 *** (.000) .0000 (.000) -.0001 *** (.000)
GDP(t-1)*large .0039 *** (.001) .0000 *** (.000) .0009 *** (.000)
GDP(t-2)*large .0049 *** (.001) .0000 *** (.000) .0003 *** (.000)
GDP(t-3)*large -.0011 (.001) .0000 (.000) .0003 (.000)
GDP(t-4)*large -.0010 (.001) .0000 (.000) .0001 (.000)
No. of obs. 4,360,644 2,526,554 2,526,554
Source: IABS, transformed to a quarterly data set by the authors. Time period considered:
1980/I-2003/III.
Note: Numbers shown are marginal effects; a ***/**/* indicates a 1%/5%/10% level of sig-
nificance. Base category: individuals aged 15-24, low-skilled, with 1 quarter of previous
(un)employment, working in establishments with 1-19 employees. Fixed effects regressions also
include quarterly dummies. Marginal effects of the interaction terms are estimated following Ai
and Norton (2003).
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Table A.9: Fixed effects estimation, unemployment-to-employment flows
FE (individual) FE (spell) FErestr (individual)
Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.)
large -.0839 *** (.003) -.0301 *** (.003) -.0462 *** (.003)
Age 25-29 -.1134 *** (.002) -.0493 *** (.003) -.0928 *** (.003)
Age 30-34 -.1534 *** (.002) -.0681 *** (.004) -.1226 *** (.003)
Age 35-39 -.1784 *** (.003) -.0773 *** (.005) -.1400 *** (.003)
Age 40-44 -.1908 *** (.003) -.0801 *** (.005) -.1518 *** (.004)
Age 45-49 -.1938 *** (.003) -.0792 *** (.005) -.1559 *** (.004)
Age 50-54 -.2003 *** (.003) -.0765 *** (.005) -.1585 *** (.004)
Age 55-65 -.2077 *** (.003) -.0741 *** (.005) -.1597 *** (.005)
Medium-skilled -.0136 *** (.003) .0015 (.003) -.0064 *** (.003)
High-skilled -.0205 ** (.010) .0164 (.017) -.0071 *** (.001)
duration unempl 2-5 .7878 *** (.004) .9367 *** (.002) .8861 *** (.003)
duration unempl 6-10 .7717 *** (.004) .9346 *** (.003) .8667 *** (.004)
duration unempl 11-20 .7700 *** (.004) .9366 *** (.004) .8643 *** (.004)
duration unempl 20 over .7692 *** (.004) .9386 *** (.005) .8635 *** (.004)
GDP(t) -.0004 *** (.000) -.0005 (.000) -.0020 *** (.001)
GDP(t-1) -.0127 *** (.001) -.0043 *** (.000) -.0106 *** (.001)
GDP(t-2) -.0026 *** (.001) -.0008 *** (.000) -.0038 *** (.001)
GDP(t-3) -.0042 *** (.001) -.0003 *** (.000) -.0026 *** (.001)
GDP(t-4) .0002 (.001) .0012 (.004) .0014 (.001)
GDP*large .0074 *** (.002) .0028 *** (.001) .0514 *** (.014)
GDP(t-1)*large .0133 *** (.002) .0048 *** (.001) .0931 *** (.013)
GDP(t-2)*large -.0058 *** (.002) -.0042 *** (.001) -.0771 *** (.015)
GDP(t-3)*large -.0009 (.002) -.0027 *** (.001) -.0480 *** (.014)
GDP(t-4)*large .0019 (.002) -.0004 (.001) -.0041 (.013)
No. of obs. 2,627,615 1,297,065 1,297,065
Note: See notes to Table A.8.
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Table A.10: Fixed effects estimation, separations
FE (individual) FE (spell) FErestr (individual)
Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.)
large -.1305*** (.002) -.0007*** (.000) -.0331*** (.001)
Age 25-29 -.0546*** (.002) .0004*** (.000) .0043*** (.001)
Age 30-34 -.0867*** (.002) .0006*** (.000) .0145*** (.001)
Age 35-39 -.1140*** (.002) .0008*** (.000) .0256*** (.001)
Age 40-44 -.1246*** (.002) .0009*** (.000) .0377*** (.001)
Age 45-49 -.1133*** (.003) .0010*** (.000) .0505*** (.001)
Age 50-54 -.0784*** (.004) .0012*** (.000) .0619*** (.001)
Age 55-65 .1799*** (.005) .0016*** (.000) .0901*** (.001)
Medium-skilled -.0389*** (.002) -.0001*** (.000) -.0077*** (.001)
High-skilled -.1400*** (.004) -.0013*** (.000) -.0361*** (.002)
duration empl 2-5 .0059*** (.001) .0008*** (.000) .0807*** (.001)
duration empl 6-10 -.0418*** (.002) .0009*** (.000) .0742*** (.001)
duration empl 11-20 -.0486*** (.002) .0012*** (.000) .0797*** (.001)
duration empl 21-30 -.0615*** (.002) .0012*** (.000) .0760*** (.001)
duration 30 over .0811*** (.003) .0045*** (.000) .1309*** (.002)
GDP(t) .0007*** (.000) .00007 *** (.000) .0013*** (.000)
GDP(t-1) .0064*** (.001) .00002*** (.000) .0015*** (.000)
GDP(t-2) .0058*** (.001) .00002*** (.000) .0005*** (.000)
GDP(t-3) -.0004 (.001) .00007*** (.000) -.0019*** (.000)
GDP(t-4) -.0008 (.001) -.00001 (.000) -.0020 (.002)
GDP*large -.0032*** (.001) -.00006*** (.000) -.0012*** (.000)
GDP(t-1)*large -.0033*** (.001) -.00006*** (.000) -.0010*** (.000)
GDP(t-2)*large .0025*** (.001) .00000 (.000) .0002 (.000)
GDP(t-3)*large .0086*** (.001) .00002*** (.000) .0022*** (.000)
GDP(t-4)*large .0055*** (.001) .00001*** (.000) .0014*** (.000)
No. of obs. 7,305,921 6,077,898 6,077,898
Note: See notes to Table A.8.
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Appendix B Figures
Figure B.1: Accessions and separations, 1980-2003, yearly rates
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Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: The figures are calculated as described in Section 3.2.. Shaded areas are times of recession.
Figure B.2: The dynamics of worker flows, 1980-2003, yearly rates
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Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: EE: Employer-to-employer flows; NE: Nonparticipation-to-employment flows; UE:
unemployment-to-employment flows; EN: Employment-to-nonparticipation flows; EU:
Employment-to-unemployment flows. The figures are calculated as described in Section
3.2.. Shaded areas are times of recession.
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Figure B.3: The shares in hirings by establishment size, 1980-2003, yearly rates
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Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: For each establishment size class the flows are computed as share of total hirings. EE:
Employer-to-employer flows; NE: Nonparticipation-to-employment flows; UE: unemployment-
to-employment flows; EN: Employment-to-nonparticipation flows; EU: Employment-to-
unemployment flows.
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Figure B.4: The shares in separations by establishment size, 1980-2003, yearly rates
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
EE EU EN
1−19 employees
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
EE EU EN
20−99 employees
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
EE EU EN
100−999 employees
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
EE EU EN
1000 and more employees
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: For each establishment size class the flows are computed as share of total separations. See
notes to Table B.3.
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Figure B.5: Timing of hirings and separations by establishment size, 1980-2003
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Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: This figure shows establishment size-specific worker flows as a share of total worker flows,
detrended using a HP filter. The largest establishment size class (1000 employees and more) is not
displayed here, since it shows a very similar pattern as the category 100-999 employees. Shaded
areas are times of recession.
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Figure B.6: Timing of hirings and separations by turnover size, 1997-2003
−.04
−.02
0
.02
.04
.06
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
low turnover medium turnover high turnover
Hirings
−.06
−.04
−.02
0
.02
.04
.06
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
low turnover medium turnover high turnover
Separations
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on LIAB 1993-2006.
Note: This figure shows turnover size-specific worker flows as a share of total worker flows,
detrended using a HP filter. Shaded areas are times of recession.
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Figure B.7: Churning rates by establishment size, 1997-2003
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Source: Authors’ calculations, based on LIAB 1993-2006.
Note: The churning rates are calculated as described in Section 3.2.
Figure B.8: The fraction of job-to-job transitions, which are leading to a higher wage
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Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: This figure shows the share of EE flows leading to a higher wage, detrended using a HP
filter. Shaded areas are times of recession.
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Figure B.9: The fraction of job-to-job transitions to larger/ smaller establishments,
which are leading to a higher wage
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Source: Authors’ calculations, based on IABS 1975-2004.
Note: See notes to Figure B.8.
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